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Abstract
The main goal of the article is to establish how a small country, Slovenia, promoted  its national 
interests when it held the Presidency of the Council of the EU, how this experience fits into 
the theory of small states and what lessons can be drawn for other small states. Based on a 
questionnaire administered to key Slovenian actors in the presidency, the analysis confirmed some 
of the theoretical expectations and revealed certain disparities. Our analysis confirms theoretical 
predictions that a member state can push through its national interests more easily during its 
presidency because it possesses certain powers that enable it to set the agenda, which is the most 
effective way of realising national interests. Especially true in the case of small state presidencies, 
advocating national interests can also be facilitated by a smaller range of priorities and a greater 
level of coincidence with the interests of other key actors. We revealed that, besides the country’s 
size, other factors also limited its ability to fulfil its national interests. In addition to a weak 
ability for coalition building and lobbying, the two main factors of constraint were the lack of soft 
knowledge among Slovenian officials and weak coordination among policy agents.
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Introduction
The enforcement of national interests has been a key issue of the modern 
international community, especially following the end of the Cold War. Prior 
to the collapse of the bipolar world order, international relations were mainly 
explained in terms of realist theory with the zero sum game concept. The 
collapse of the bipolar world order and emergence of a multitude of newly 
formed small states led these states, because of a lack of hard sources of 
power, to rely more on soft power (Nye 1991 2004). Large states also began 
to rely on soft power but not due to the absence of hard power. Small 
states have obviously limited internal and external resources to help them 
pursue their own (foreign policy) interests (e.g. Hey 2003). To overcome their 
small size, they use other forms of structural power (Strange 1995) such as 
the agenda-setting process which Keohane and Nye (1989) regard as one 
of the key sources of power in the modern international community. 
The article combines the theoretical framework concerning the realisation 
of the national interests of small EU member states during the Presidency 
of the Council of the European Union (EU Council)1 with empirical findings 
based on an analysis of the Slovenian EU Council Presidency of 2008.  
This prestigious assignment, which Slovenia assumed in January 2008, 
served as recognition of that nation’s statehood and successful 
integration into the EU. Becoming integrated into Europe was one of the 
main political goals of Slovenia even before it gained its independence. 
Special directives on how to adjust to Europe and checking whether its 
legislation was in line with EU directives were introduced already in 1990 
when Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia (see Svetličič 1989; Kirn 2012). 
Already during the accession negotiations, Slovenia showed a high level 
of engagement that led to its successfully joining the EU in May 2004. 
Slovenia was constantly reaffirming its EU commitment, first with its rapid 
entry to the euro zone in January 2007, and subsequently by joining the 
Schengen area later that same year. Representing the last challenge 
and necessary experience that set it apart from the old member states, 
Slovenia was aware that the presidency would not be an easy task. 
1 The term “the Council of the EU” is not completely accurate, although we decided to use it since the Slovenian 
Presidency took place before the Lisbon Treaty and the changes it brought to the configuration of the Council. 
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The challenge was threefold because, firstly, the Slovenian Presidency 
had to prove that after the closure of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement 
processes the new member states were suitable not only to belong to 
the club, but also to lead it. Secondly, with the new system of a rotating 
presidency, Slovenia had to show that small new EU members could also 
be good chairs. Thirdly, being part of the first presiding trio, Slovenia’s 
Presidency also had to help justify the “trio team presidency system in 
terms of coherence and consistency in EU policies, not only by carrying 
out the programme but also by keeping the trio’s priorities high on the 
agenda” (Kajnč 2009: 89).
The originality of this article lies in its methodological approach. This is 
namely the first empirical evaluation based on a survey among actors 
of the first presiding newcomer member state that formed part of the first 
trio.2 It sheds new light on the role of the presidency of small states when 
small new members are in the seat and the presidency is conducted in 
the new, trio form. Most authors dealing with the EU have not put the 
issue of national interest in the forefront. They have predominantly based 
their approach on the legal basis of the presidency, including the norms 
guiding and influencing it (see Niemann and Mak 2011) that stipulate the 
presiding country should be an honest broker and promote community 
interests rather than national ones. This article makes national interests the 
focus of its research. In an attempt to be realistic, it establishes through 
the eyes of the presidency’s actors (via survey among them) not only the 
extent to which these idealistic expectations were met, but also to what 
extent and how countries nevertheless like to use the presidency as an 
opportunity to enforce their national interests.
With this focus in mind, the primary goals of this article are (1) to establish 
whether Slovenia was more successful in realising its national interests as 
the chair with agenda-shaping capacity as compared to the normal EU 
membership, during its presidency; (2) to examine how Slovenia balanced 
its national interests with those of other trio and other EU member states; 
and (3) to determine whether the Slovenian Presidency provides some 
new theoretical insights. The analysis is based on a quantitative method 
(survey) conducted among the Slovenian actors involved in the 
presidency. The data were analysed from two main aspects: the extent to 
2 More on the role of the trio in: Udovič and Svetličič, 2014.
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which the theoretical premises about small states’ behaviour concerning 
the realisation of national interests during the EU Council Presidency can 
explain Slovenia’s behaviour and the extent to which the realisation of 
national interests was the result of Slovenia’s proactive ability rather than 
the interplay of the interests of other EU actors.
The article is divided into five parts. The first two sections present the 
theoretical framework for discussing the EU Council Presidency in light 
of national interests. The next section presents the methodology along 
with the results of the empirical research. The last part sets out the main 
conclusions with lessons learned for small country presidencies in general. 
A. Literature Review
A.1. National Interests
The definition of national interests remains a complex and under-researched 
topic in the social sciences. It is difficult to objectively define because of the 
involvement of subjective interests, the complexity and changeability of the 
issue over time and the difficulties of distinguishing subjective interests from 
public interests. Consequently, because theorists are far from united, there 
is a plurality of (sometimes opposing) definitions, including the following: 
1. National interests are objectively determined and exist indepen-
dently of subjects that are only able to recognise this objectivity. 
Morgenthau (1951; 1995) claims national interests are defined by 
power. 
2. National interests cannot be objectively defined (Aron 1975). Their 
interpretation can only be subjective since they represent the sum 
of individual interests that reflect their preferences and derive from 
their values, making it impossible to measure them objectively. 
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4. There is a dialectic unity of subjective and objective views whereby 
one has to be aware that national interests are usually defined by 
governments/elites (McLean 1996).
Roskin (1994: 36) posits that “national interest may be difficult to define 
due to the warping effects of ideology, the global system, public and 
elite convictions, the mass media, and policy inertia”. Many are therefore 
against the concept of national interest in general.3 Firstly, because the 
term “national interest” is ambiguous—it is difficult to define it clearly and 
it is uncertain with regard to the relationship between particular interests 
and the national interest. Secondly, the concept does not provide a clear 
guide to the formulation of foreign policy4 and “it may encourage an 
attitude of narrow nationalism” (Morgenthau 1951: 6; Frankel 1970: 42–43; 
Clinton 1994: 21–22). 
In general, we can distinguish four schools of thought regarding national 
interests, ranging from those claiming that it is something objectively given 
to those claiming that it is something subjectively constructed. Realists 
traditionally, and constructivists more recently, claim that the national 
interest is a key explanatory tool in the analysis and understanding of 
contemporary foreign policy. Realists like Morgenthau believe that 
national interests are constant, are objectively given and do not vary 
in time and space (see also Waltz 1979). According to a realist view, EU 
decision-making attributes greater power to larger states (e.g. Pedersen 
1998). According to liberalism, states could no longer rely on simple power 
politics in an interdependent world and should (according to the idealist 
approach) act ethically in the international arena. A subjectivist sees 
national interests as a sum of individual preferences. The constructivist 
school (Wendt 1992) argues that interests are created in the interactions 
among actors and are not given.
National interests help states define themselves in relation to their external 
environment through: (1) the power they possess to define and enforce 
those interests (Morgenthau 1995) and (2) their ability to translate them 
3 Rosenau (1980: 284–286) claims that “the national interest is ‘essentially erroneous’”. He recalled that the national 
interest is rooted in values and that different states do in fact pursue different ends. Kratochwill (1982) suggests defining 
national interest as analogous to public interest although his contribution is in fact differentiating between the two. 
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into viable national policy guidelines (Plano and Olton 1988). Inevitably, 
national interests differ on the basis of a country’s size, which makes size 
an important factor; namely, it raises the question of differences in ability 
and, consequently, in the ways and means small and large states pursue 
their national interests (Svetličič 2002). This is reflected in the behavioural 
dynamics of EU membership, not only during regular membership but 
especially at a time of chairing the EU Council.
A.2. National Interests, the EU Council Presidency and the 
Role of Small States 
The preconditions for successfully realising a country’s national interests are 
undeniably its influence and power. EU member states can derive these 
from either formal or informal power sources (Wallace 1985), giving them 
a certain leverage over negotiation outcomes. Regardless of size, this 
leverage increases significantly during the time they hold the EU Council 
Presidency. However, size plays an important role because it determines 
member states’ presidencies and their ability to pursue and realise their 
national interests as chairs. To establish the role of size in determining 
member states’ behaviour in negotiations and the way they pursue 
national interests during the EU Council Presidency, it is first necessary to 
focus on the theoretical dilemma concerning the (un)privileged role of 
the presidency in pursuing a state’s national interests.
A.2.1. The role of the presidency and the realisation of national interests
In theory, the pursuit of national interests during the presidency can 
come into question since “it is almost a precondition for the successful 
fulfilment of its functions, and in particular the brokerage role, that the 
Presidency does not use its position as Chair in negotiations to promote 
special national interests.5 Instead, “it must adhere to the Council’s rules of 
procedure, which demand neutrality” (Kietz 2008: 10). When at the helm, 
member states have certain limitations on pursuing their national interests. 
Their behaviour as chair is curbed by formal decision rules for the adoption 
of proposals and informal norms of neutrality, impartiality, effectiveness 
(Tallberg 2004) and consensus-building (Elgström 2006; Thomson 2011: 244). 
5 After analysing eight Council presidents, Kirchner (1992: 114) concluded that “most appeared prepared, to a 
considerable extent, to put the Community interest above the national interest”. 
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Because they are judged for their “productivity”, presidencies sometimes 
compromise their own national preferences to ensure deals are agreed 
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999). It may nevertheless be expected that all 
states want to pursue their national interests during their presidencies at 
least to some extent (Tallberg 2004; Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006). 
They try to make some national imprint by launching their own policies or 
initiatives. To be successful, they must be able to present such interests as 
also being common EU interests, which gives them the support of other 
members.
When holding the presidency, member states can materialise national 
interests by carrying out the following roles: administrative and 
coordinative, agenda-setting (standing out as the most important 
instrument), mediating, leadership and representative. 
The perception of the EU Presidency varies with the author’s position. Some 
regard the presidency as “responsibility without power” (Dewost 1984: 2), 
while others claim that the EU Presidency puts member states in a privileged 
position, enabling them to choose whether to use the presidency as an 
“amplifier” of their own interests or as “silencer” of these interests (Bengtsson 
et al. 2004) by giving priority to the common European interests.
Some go even further by arguing that the presidency undisputedly 
influences negotiations and decision-making through the agenda-shaping 
process (Tallberg 2003a, 2003b; Warntjen 2007);6 namely, the presidency 
enjoys certain prerogatives of steering the Council’s legislative work 
(Warntjen 2007). These prerogatives include additional power resources 
such as asymmetrical access to information and asymmetrical control of 
the negotiating processes (Tallberg 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006). They enable 
the presidency to influence the pace of negotiations despite the agenda 
it inherits. Through agenda-setting, mediation and good negotiation skills, 
the presidency can regulate the intensity of discussion on a particular 
dossier and the way of introducing (or even omitting) certain policy issues 
from institutional negotiation. 
6 Besides adding policies to the agenda, the presidency has the power of agenda-shaping which includes agenda-
setting, agenda-structuring, and agenda-exclusion (Tallberg 2003a, 2003b, 2006). The presidency can either push 
forward or neglect certain policy proposals or areas. This influence is usually defined by the national preferences of an 
individual presiding country (Tallberg 2003a).
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Empirical studies (Schalk et al. 2007; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2008) also 
confirmed that the country’s influence on the negotiation outcomes 
is greater during its time at the helm. However, this influence is mostly 
dependant on external factors7 and not so much on the presidency’s 
engagement in the negotiation processes. Thomson (2008: 611–612) 
stresses that the presiding country can influence the timing of the legislative 
process, but it has little influence over the duration of decision-making 
or the content of policy outcomes. Therefore, the discretion that Council 
presidents have to shape the agenda is indeed limited, mostly also due to 
the short six-month tenure and the inherited agenda. 
Despite these constraints, the Council presidency gives incumbent 
member states a resource with which they can influence decision 
outcomes in line with their preferences (e.g. Tallberg 2004, 2006: 29–39; 
Bunse 2009).
Promotion of national interests during the Presidency gained a new 
dimension with the introduction of the presidency trio8 by the Lisbon 
Treaty. With the treaty, the official roles of the presidency were further 
reduced by the establishment of the President of the European Council 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, now chairing the Council in certain formations. These changes 
greatly affected and restructured the role of the rotating presidency, 
diminishing its role in the foreign and security arena and shifting its 
influence more towards the EU’s internal level. Not surprisingly, Mazzucelli 
(2008: 10), for example, calculated that the role of the presidency would 
be reduced by 10% [in the post Lisbon years]. Brandy (2007: 1) states that 
“the six-month rotating presidency was acceptable with an EU of 12 or 
even 15, but is simply impractical in an EU of 27 members”. Arregui and 
Thomson (2009) suggest that the rotating presidency is less relevant in the 
enlarged EU as it was in the EU-15. Other researchers confirm that the 
rotating presidency would even in the enlarged EU play an important role 
in consensus-building (Szabó 2011). 
7 According to Thomson (2008: 612) the decision-making process is determined by factors outside of presidents’ control: 
the involvement of the European Parliament, the decision rule in the Council and the polarisation of actors’ positions 
on a legislative proposal.
8 The trio was established to “force” presiding states to pursue common (Community) interests rather than their own. 
However, after its introduction there were several criticisms that “the institutionalisation of the trio-Presidency with one 
large state being part of each set can be seen as ensuring that large states’ interests are defended at all times” (also 
through the work of small states in the presidency chair; authors’ comment) (Klemenčič 2007, executive summary).
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In spite of such different views, we can conclude that each presiding 
country tends to influence the EU agenda. Hence, the main question is 
realistically not whether presiding states pursue national interests, but how 
they try to do it. Do they use both power resources to their advantage 
by pursuing their own national interests or do they endeavour to realise 
mainly the common European ones? Here the behaviour of small and 
large member states varies significantly.
A.2.2.Country size as a factor in presidency behaviour
According to the rationalist approach, the presidency influences the 
negotiation process using additional power resources, which is typical of 
large state presidency behaviour. That the presidency uses these resources 
to pursue its own national interests has been confirmed several times in 
practice.9 On the other hand, the sociological approach claims that the 
presidency’s behaviour harbours compromise and endeavours to realise the 
common European interests instead of involving its own in the negotiation 
(Dewost 1984; Wallace 1985; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). 
Obviously, size determines Presidency behaviour. For large states, 
“productivity” and the norm of effectiveness are often pretexts for partial 
behaviour which gains its momentum from the far better use of power 
resources than small states can afford. The reason is that large member 
states have interests in basically all policy areas and are generally expected 
to use the role of chair to pursue their own interests (Bengtsson et al. 2004). 
Conversely, small states compromise their own national preferences 
by following in more detail the formal norms of presidency conduct. In 
addition to their small size, new member states face the challenge of 
adapting to and integrating into the EU’s system of decision-making. The 
process through which policy demands are transformed into decision 
outcomes is defined by informal bargaining. To participate effectively in 
such informal processes, state representatives need strong relationships 
with representatives of other states. Such relationships take time to form. 
Consequently, new member states may be at a disadvantage compared 
to old members, at least in the period soon after their accession. It has been 
suggested that new member states have not had a marked influence on 
9 An example of a one-sided and assertive presidency was dealing with the situation in Iraq when Great Britain held it 
in 1998. For more details on similar cases of assertive presidencies, see Elgström (2003).
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decision outcomes (Goetz 2005: 254), which may indicate that they have 
less power than the old members, but it does not imply that their power is 
marginal (see Thomson 2011: 188, 199).
Because small states have less specific national interests, this helps them 
juggle normative behaviour with effectiveness. They can afford to follow 
the logic of appropriateness, “which increases their credibility in reaching 
a compromise among the Member States in the Council negotiations” 
(Kajnč 2008a: 2–3) and which for them, unlike for larger states, represents 
an additional source of competence. 
The fact that they depend a great deal on the assistance of EU institutions10 
and can pursue a more modest number of national interests may not 
affect the quality of their presidencies. The only difference between small 
and large states can be seen in the former’s different choice of negotiation 
tactics and use of conflict-avoiding negotiation behaviour as a source 
of power. Smaller states are forced to prioritise between sectors without 
damaging their interests, usually remaining proactive and inflexible in their 
most important sector(s). They generally only focus on one priority (or a few) 
and, through specialisation (Baillie 1999) dedicate their otherwise limited 
administrative resources to prepare well in these areas (Klemenčič 2007). 
Therefore, they are not considered a threat. Others perceive them as weak, 
which gives them the opportunity to use this non-competitive relationship 
to their advantage. Because they usually remain in the background, other 
member states tend to show greater tolerance and understanding when 
small states want to pursue those few national interests. 
Paradoxically, in this case smallness increases the influence and prestige that 
stem from the institute of the presidency because it enables small states to 
play the role of a compromise-oriented honest broker. This perception not only 
gives them the necessary legitimacy to run the presidency, but allows them to 
incorporate some of their national interests within the framework of common 
(communitarian) interests. Therefore, several analyses (Beach 2004; Quaglia 
and Moxon-Browne 2006; Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006) have confirmed 
that small states are in turn more successful when holding the presidency. 
10 Due to limited human resources, small states are far more dependent than large ones on the assistance of the 
General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and European Commission (EC). The GSC helps them draw up a much 
documentation that large states usually prepare on their own, and for small states the EC represents an ally against 
the influence of large states and an advocate for the common EU interests.
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The following sections analyse the Slovenian EU Council Presidency of 
2008 to establish if Slovenia conformed with the normative behaviour of 
small member state presidencies and how that affected the realisation of 
its national interests. 
B. The Slovenian EU Council Presidency of 2008
Slovenia started its presidency in January 2008 as the last country of the 
first presiding trio.11 Being the first newcomer and one of the smallest 
countries to have ever held the presidency,12 Slovenia began its 
presidency preparations already in 2005, almost two years ahead of the 
normal practice (Bratkovič, A. 2009, pers. comm., 28 May) and established 
the organisational structure for the presidency preparations as early as 
January 2005.13 
Slovenia chose to have a so-called Brussels-based presidency, making 
the Permanent Representation (PermRep) in Brussels the core of its 
presidency activities. This was a good organisational decision because 
it concentrated the most capable Slovenian officials in a small, yet very 
flexible and agile nucleus (Mejač, Ž. 2009, pers. comm., 3 June). 
Given the modest size of its public administration, Slovenia also had to 
adjust the organisational structure in the capital. Due to limited human 
resources, Slovenia optimised the working processes and tried to lessen 
the effects of the organisational/administrative barriers of its public 
administration by adapting the structure in three ways, namely by: (1) 
merging working fields, (2) having one person in charge of several domains 
11 “The trio system was agreed at the meeting of Permanent Representatives to the EU in March 2006 and approved 
by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in June 2006, replacing the previous one-year operational 
programme and three-year strategic programme for the Union by an 18-month programme of three successive 
Presidencies” (Kajnč 2008b: 5–6). The first trio presidency took place from January 2007 until June 2008 and was 
composed of Germany, Portugal and Slovenia.
12 Apart from Luxembourg, which shared the presidency with the Netherlands, Slovenia was the smallest country to have 
presided over the Council of the European Union.
13 Decision of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia no. 901-04/2004-2 dated 6 January 2005. A core working 
group for the presidency was established in order to coordinate the preparations also at the political level, deciding 
the programme and its priorities and all decisions having financial consequences. Other countries usually did not have 
such a high-level political coordination body.
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and (3) entrusting the staff with preliminary experience of the field to 
handle the tasks at hand. Nevertheless, Slovenia still needed external 
assistance to cover certain areas of EU policies where it was understaffed. 
This assistance mostly came from the General Secretariat of the Council 
(GSC) and the European Commission (EC).14 Such staff limitations were 
also reflected in the six-month programme of the presidency, during which 
Slovenia pursued mostly issues that were part of the inherited agenda and 
limited itself to only one priority of national interest, the Western Balkans. 
B.1. National Interest during the Slovenian EU Council 
Presidency 2008
Accession to the EU and to NATO had been the two primary goals of the 
Slovenian development strategy15 and foreign policy towards the EU ever 
since the 1990s, including the Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy formulated 
in 1999 (Bojinović & Požgan 2014).16 EU membership represented a vital 
national interest that was also reflected in Slovenia’s proactive endeavours 
during the accession negotiations that brought it the reputation of a “star 
pupil” (Klemenčič 2007: 12). And the presidency also represented a national 
interest. The decision to undertake the presidency was supported by the 
National Assembly already on 17 November 2004, where the programme 
and presidency priorities were later also presented and debated. The 
Declaration on the Orientation of the Activities of the Republic of Slovenia 
within the institution of the EU for the period January 2007 to July 2008 
singled out the presidency as one of a number of strategic tasks (Official 
Journal of the Republic of Slovenia No. 60/2004). As in the case of EU 
membership, all the political parties were also united in supporting the 
decision to undertake the presidency. The agreement among all political 
parties was signed on 17 May 2007 to support the successful Presidency 
of Slovenia of the EU Council. It stipulated the productive cooperation of 
14 For more information, see Cerjak (2010).
15 The first strategy prepared in Slovenia about approaching Europe was the so-called Development Strategy (Potočnik 
et al. 1995) while the next one, on international economic relations (Bobek et al. 1996), was already entitled From 
Associated to Full Membership. A year later, the Strategy for Integration into the EU was prepared and adopted by 
the Slovenian government (Mrak et al. 1998).  
16 After the accession in 2004, Slovenia has not reframed its foreign policy strategy, nor has it declaratively established 
a platform for the formation of the Slovenia–EU relationship (Šabič and Lange 2014). An attempt to establish a new 
foreign policy strategy (2010) that would further elaborate the relationship with the EU was unsuccessful. The only link 
between Slovenian national interests and the EU is the Strategy on the Western Balkans adopted in 2010 (Udovič 2011; 
Zupančič and Udovič 2011), arguing that Slovenia should serve as a bridge between the EU and Western Balkan 
countries (see also Udovič and Turnšek 2011).
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all parties in formulating the presidency priorities before the government 
decided on them.
Due to such proactive engagement, Klemenčič (2007) also predicted 
that Slovenia would use the Presidency as an opportunity “to profile itself 
within the EU and internationally as a competent, efficient and committed 
EU Member State”.
Based on the 18-month programme of the presiding trio, Slovenia chose 
the following five priorities for the term of its presidency:
1. the future of the Union and timely entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty;
2. the successful launch of the new Lisbon Strategy cycle;
3. making a step forward in addressing climate/energy issues;
4. strengthening the European perspective on the Western Balkans; and
5. promoting dialogue between cultures, beliefs and traditions in the 
context of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue.17
According to Kajnč (2009: 89), “While the first three priorities largely form 
part of the inherited agenda and promoting intercultural dialogue was 
more of a symbolic effort, the focus on the Western Balkans was a true 
Slovenian priority”.18 Even though Slovenia only had this priority that was 
closely related to its national interest, the overall goal of the presidency 
was not to come up with endless initiatives, but to “seek to add value by 
looking across all policy dossiers for linkages and using these to provide a 
genuine response to globalisation” (Lenarčič 2007).
Even though “some observers had expressed (implicit) doubts prior to 
January 2008 whether this tiny country would be able to handle the EU 
17 More on the priorities of the Slovenian Presidency is available at: http://www.eu2008.si/en/ The_Council_Presidency/
Priorities_Programmes/indexd41d.html. [accessed 27 March 2014]. 
18 The Western Balkans was the only true Slovenian priority that did not overlap with the German or the Portuguese 
programme (Grabnar 2007: 6). Due to Slovenia’s proactive role, it reached important milestones in the process of 
integrating the Western Balkans into Europe, namely the vizum liberalisation for all the countries of the region, the 
signing of the Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with Serbia, solid mediation in handling Kosovo’s independence 
and its recognition and wise protection of national interests (the retention of the ecological fishing zone) during the 
accession negotiations with Croatia. More in Cerjak (2010).
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Presidency”19 (Šabič 2009: 3), one has to bear in mind that “newcomers 
historically view their inaugural presidency as a chance to prove their 
‘European’ credentials” (Lewis 2006: 15). Therefore, Klemenčič (2007) was 
right to predict that Slovenia would play it safe during the presidency, but 
that it would also do anything to at least retain if not further enhance its 
European reputation. 
With the Western Balkans as the only substantive priority, the solid 
realisation of the presidency and good performance as a presiding 
country represented for Slovenia a far more important, overarching 
and pertinent national interest. Therefore, the realisation of national 
interests in the context of the Slovenian EU Council Presidency should be 
considered in a much broader sense: not only as foreign policy goals that 
were explicitly mentioned in the aforementioned strategic documents 
(Slovenian Development and Foreign Policy Strategy, the Programme 
and Priorities of the Slovenian EU Presidency), but also as the undeclared, 
implicit national interests national interests that can be understood as part 
of the broader development strategy objectives of Slovenia as well as the 
EU that lead to the well-being of the population.
The six-month programme and the priorities of the Slovenian Presidency 
can thus be interpreted as contributing also to the general strengthening 
of European integration and values, the internal consolidation of the EU 
and regional cooperation.20
In this sense, the article looks at national interests as the general public 
interest that as such includes everything that enhances the well-being 
of Slovenian nationals. It is not something declared by a government, 
political party, ministry or elite, but can vary between different groups. 
Therefore, such broad conception of national interests was also included 
in our survey, which was the primary methodological tool (see section 
C). We did not want to compare the results of the presidency only 
with the presidency priorities, declared national interests from national 
strategic documents and development strategies or the trio presidency 
19 The Economist, for example, remarked that Slovenia really had just one priority for its term: to run it smoothly, or 
according to one official interviewed by the Economist, “just not screw it up”. (Economist 2006:51) 
20 A more detailed presentation of the Slovenian Presidency priorities and their general contribution to the positive 
development of the entire EU can be found in the Slovenian six-month programme, available at: http://www.eu2008.
si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/Programme_en.pdf [accessed 22 December 2014]. 
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programme. The respondents were asked about their own views of the 
national interests during their work for the presidency. This gave some 
interesting and tangible results, namely, that different institutions many 
times also had different views on national interests and those views were 
more often than not opposing.
C. Methodology and Research Questions 
The empirical part of this article is based on the analysis of a survey 
conducted among actors involved in the Slovenian Presidency.21
The survey was structured around the following three research questions:
1. Was Slovenia able to realise its own interests during its presidency 
more easily than during the time of normal membership (and if so, 
to what extent)? Did it do so independently or did it just recognise 
the communitarian interests and pursue them as such?
2. How did Slovenia as the presiding state balance its own interests 
with the interests of other, especially larger, EU member states? How 
did it navigate among the interests of the other trio countries and EU 
institutions? Did other countries help Slovenia formulate its national 
interests or did they impede their ability to do so?
3. Did Slovenia’s behaviour as the chair reflect the theoretical prem-
ises about the realisation of small states’ national interests during the 
presidency of the EU Council or did it deviate from this usual small 
state behaviour? 
Our anonymous electronic survey consisting of 40 questions was 
conducted by Kajnč and Svetličič between 9 July and 4 September 
2008. It was sent directly via the distribution list of the Presidency Human 
21 The first results of this survey in view of the realisation of national interests were published in the Slovenian language by 
Svetličič and Cerjak (2012).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (74) - 2015
20
Resources Sub-Group, which included those responsible for substantive 
dossiers (454 people)22. Separately, the survey was distributed to diplomats 
and other public servants working on substantive issues at the Permanent 
Representation of the Republic of Slovenia to the EU (PermRep), and 
to other diplomatic and consular representations of the Republic of 
Slovenia (RS) abroad (44 people). In total, the survey was distributed to 
667 addressees. We received 407 replies (61%), of which 235 (35%) were 
fully completed while in 172 cases (26%) the respondents left at least one 
question unanswered. The survey is biased in the sense that it represents 
the views of actors directly involved in the activity that is being evaluated 
as well as an over-representation of foreign policy diplomats. 
D. Results of the Slovenian Presidency Survey 
Although theoretical opinions on possibilities of realising national interests 
through agenda-setting during the presidency are split,23 authors mostly 
agree that the presidency increases the chances of influencing decision-
making, thus helping their realisation. The same ambivalence was 
reflected in the experiences of the Slovenian respondents. As shown in 
Table 1, almost a quarter of the respondents claimed that the presidency 
facilitated the materialisation of Slovenia’s national interests (24.6%) and 
only a small share (7.5%) stated that it made it harder. 
22  Respondents were civil servants presiding over working groups, as well as their proxies and experts who cooperated 
on the dossiers as national delegates.
23 See section A.2.1.
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Table 1. How Do You Rate the Difficulty of Advocating Slovenian Interests 
in the EU during the Time of the Presidency?24
N %
There were no specific Slovenian interests in my working area. 76 33.3
Slovenia defended/enforced its interests more easily during the 
presidency.
56 24.6
Because of the presidency, we had to give priority to interests of the 
EU.
48 21.1
The presidency had no influence on the difficulty of defending/
enforcing Slovenian interests.
31 13.6





At the same time, another 33.3% claimed that Slovenia had no specific 
interests in their working area, which could question the premise about 
the facilitated materialisation of national interests. On one hand, this result 
might partially confirm the theoretical expectation that small states do 
not have strong interests in a vast range of policies,25 but on the other 
hand it could be interpreted as an impediment to Slovenia’s agenda-
setting capabilities. 
Being without specific national interests in a vast range of EU issues, 
Slovenia instead focused on a limited number of areas jointly established 
by the trio presidency programme.26 A very obvious national interest was 
to administer the presidency well, to enhance the reputation of Slovenia 
to be perceived (also thanks to the presidency) “as a truly European star 
pupil” (anonymous referee observation). This was corroborated by 21.1% 
of the respondents, who claimed that Slovenia had given priority to EU 
interests. This has an important consequence, namely that, in order to 
realise such national interest Slovenia mostly did not have to give up its 
position in favour of the EU one, which leads us to believe that the 33.3% of 
respondents without specific national interests in their working area most 
24 If not stated otherwise, the tables represent the findings of our survey.
25 It could also reflect poor preparations.
26 Of the trio presidency programme priorities, Slovenia only had one area of true national interest, namely, the future 
perspective of the Western Balkans (Cerjak 2010). If we consider that multicultural dialogue was more of a symbolic 
gesture than a real priority, the rest of the priority list was clearly part of the inherited agenda (Kajnč 2009).
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likely also followed the European agenda. The same conclusion can be 
drawn from Table 2, which shows a high level of accordance of Slovenian 
interests with those of other EU actors. 









The interests of Slovenia matched those 
of the majority of other member states.
221 39.8 55.2 5
The interests of Slovenia matched those 
of the trio partner states.
210 21.4 61.9 16.9
The interests of Slovenia matched those 
of the GCS.
209 23.4 58.9 17.7
The interests of Slovenia matched those 
of the EC.
209 14.8 67.9 17.2
The interests of Slovenia matched those 
of a particular group of states.
214 28 54.7 17.3
 
Slovenia’s interests matched the most with those of other member states 
(40%) as well as the GSC and the EC (38% altogether). The latter can be 
easily explained since in its first-ever residency Slovenia relied substantially 
on the help of the GSC and EC which is usual in the case of small member 
states’ presidencies (Cerjak 2010) and, consequently, also an expression 
of the least damaging position in light of a non-existent goal in a particular 
policy area (as suggested by an anonymous referee). Conversely, there 
was a slightly lower share of the accordance of interests with other trio 
countries (21.4%), which could mean that: (1) Slovenia as the last country 
of that trio instead focused on its own six-month presidency programme; 
or (2) by the end, most of the programme had already been finalised 
by Germany and Portugal. Further, considering the low level of support 
for the claim that Slovenia’s interests varied from those of other actors 
(approximately 15% on average), it can be inferred that the alignment 
of interests was most likely one reason that facilitated the realisation of 
Slovenia’s national interests during its presidency.
Looking again at the alternative interpretation of the results in Table 1, 
one can also understand the lack of national interests in a vast range of 
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fields as a potential impediment to Slovenia’s agenda-setting capacity. 
Intuitively, it would be expected that, when holding the presidency, 
Slovenia would also have defined positions on issues not directly linked to 
its national interests since they were indirectly related to the presidency’s 
broad national interests. Therefore, the finding that one-third of officials 
had no specific interests in their issue areas could be alarming. The lack 
of clearly defined positions could translate into Slovenia’s weak agenda-
setting capacity—one of the main mechanisms for realising national 
interests. 
Table 3. Do You Agree with the Following Statements about Agenda 




I determined the agenda according to the programme of the 
presidency.
152 77.6 22.4
I determined the agenda according to my own judgement. 152 62.5 37.5
I determined the agenda as a combination of priorities arising 
from the programme of the presidency and Slovenian national 
priorities.
148 58.1 41.9
The agenda was determined by external events. 148 31.8 68.2
The agenda was mostly influenced by the GCS. 148 23.6 76.4
I did not have a role which included the possibility of shaping 
the agenda.
144 16.2 84.0
The agenda was mostly influenced by the EC. 147 13.6 86.4
The agenda was determined by the trio. 147 8.2 91.3
The agenda was mostly influenced by the EP. 145 2.1 97.9
 
Table 3 shows that Slovenia appeared quite sovereign and independent 
in its agenda-formation capacity. Namely, almost 63% of respondents 
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claimed that they set the agenda according to their own judgement, 
whereas 58% of respondents said the agenda-setting was a combination 
of presidency programme priorities and Slovenian national priorities. This 
would mean that Slovenia played quite an autonomous role in forming 
the agenda and that its agenda-setting ability was not affected by its 
lack of national interests. However, one should also take into consideration 
the 77.6% of respondents who claimed they determined the agenda in 
accordance with the presidency programme, which contained among 
five priorities only one that can be narrowly defined as direct Slovenia 
national interest (see p. 13). This high figure is not surprising given the 
conclusions of Table 1 that Slovenia, lacking its own interests, largely 
followed the EU agenda. Therefore, it can be inferred that the absence 
of interests in a vast range of issues and alignment with EU interests only 
gave the illusion of independent agenda-formation. In reality, this duty 
was quite strongly influenced by the presidency programme, in which 
Slovenia put more emphasis on European priorities and much less on 
Slovenian national interests in order to be perceived as a good European. 
This in turn means that Slovenia’s agenda-setting prerogative as the chair 
was relatively limited, due also to its own inability to put among its own 
presidency programme priorities that were more of its national interests.
The lack of national interests can also be regarded as being in line with the 
theoretical postulate that small member states are more effective when 
holding the presidency. The absence of national interests helped Slovenia 
gain the trust of other member states, enabling it to close certain dossiers 
that had been open for a long time and had failed to be adopted during 
several previous presidencies.27 This subsequently enabled the realisation 
of another, far greater national interest that was vital for Slovenia, 
namely, to carry out the presidency project well and without any missteps 
(Bratkovič, A. 2009, pers. comm., 28 May).
In addition to the lack of national interests, Slovenia encountered some 
other problems that made it less proactive in fully realising its national 
interests, and forced it to play the role of an honest broker. 
27 Examples of such dossiers were negotiations for the Return Directive, the legislative package for liberalisation of the 
electricity and gas internal market, confirmation of the mandate to open negotiations on a new agreement between 
the EU and Russia, and the proposal for the Directive on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Cerjak 2010). 
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Table 4. Difficulty of Pursuing National Interests and the Main Problematic 
Issues of the Slovenian Presidency (in %) 
Problem area 
















Human resources deficit 39.3 47.1 48.4 46.1 60.4
Poor vertical cooperation 
within department
42.9 29.4 48.4 40.8 33.3
Insufficient interdepartmental 
cooperation
25.0 29.4 51.6 36.8 45.8
Hierarchy within institutions 
stifled initiative
33.9 35.3 29.0 28.9 31.3
Insufficient knowledge in 
related fields and awareness 
of linkages
25.0 35.3 25.8 28.9 22.9
Insufficient information on the 
substance of relevant issues
19.6 17.6 16.1 27.6 20.8
Internal political problems 26.8 29.4 19.4 19.7 22.9
Unfamiliarity with the EU 
institutions’ functioning
16.1 11.8 12.9 21.1 18.8
Insufficient knowledge in the 
field of operation
10.7 35.3 16.1 13.2 8.3
  
Source: Based on our survey and elaborated by Kajnč and Svetličič (2009)
A comparative analysis of answers about problematic presidency issues and the 
difficulty of advocating national interests (Table 4) revealed several obstacles 
to the performance of Slovenia’s Presidency in realising its national interests: 
(1) human resources deficit (47.1%),28 (2) hierarchy within institutions that stifled 
initiative (35.3%)29 and (3) insufficient knowledge in related fields which would 
have enabled linkages (also 35.3%). When linking the last with responses about 
the lack of knowledge in the field of operation (35.3%), it can be concluded that 
it was, in fact, the lack of knowledge altogether that was the biggest obstacle. 
28 A human resources deficit has been a permanent feature of Slovenia’s foreign policy development (Roter 2009). On 
the other hand, the presidency has been an important element in the socialisation of foreign policy elites (Bunič and 
Šabič 2013).
29 This, together with poor vertical cooperation within the department (42.9%), was also recognised as a major problem 
by those who claimed that national interests were easier to defend during the presidency.
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These were the main problems that prevented Slovenia from successfully 
pursuing its national interests. By adjusting the organisational structure to 
avoid the common disadvantages of small states’ public administrations, 
Slovenia tried to deal with some of these issues already in the preparation 
phase of its presidency. Nevertheless, in Slovenia’s case the usual 
advantages of a small state’s public administration (e.g. flexible decision-
making and continuity of staff)30 evidently remained relevant issues 
throughout the entire presidency and affected the realisation of Slovenia’s 
national interests.31 
Inflexible decision-making and staffing problems in particular affected 
informal contacts among public servants. In terms of the better realisation 
of national interests, improved informal communication would have 
helped identify national interests and bolster more coherent cooperation 
in their definition and realisation. Our research showed that Slovenia 
generally had frequent informal contacts, but they were not the most 
intensive within its own public administration.32
Table 5. How Regular Were Your Informal Contacts with the Following 
Actors?
N
Often or very 
often (%)
Seldom or very 
seldom (%)
Representatives of other member states 226 84.5 15.5
Public servants/diplomats of RS 227 77.9 22.0
GSC Officials 224 73.2 26.8
EC Officials 226 71.7 28.3
Interest groups, non-governmental 
organisations
224 26.8 73.2
Officials and parliamentarians of the EP 221 18.1 81.9
 
30 See section B.
31 The study of Svetličič and Kajnč (2010) showed that as many as 80% of respondents were convinced that, in the case 
of the next presidency, an improvement in the cooperation among ministries within the Slovenian public administration 
as well as between institutions is of the utmost importance.
32 Kajnč and Svetličič (2009) showed that informal contacts were intensive but not satisfactory since 58% of respondents 
were convinced that networking skills and informal contacts should be improved in the future. 
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Table 5 demonstrates that Slovenian civil servants had the most frequent 
contacts with officials of other member states (84.5%) and not with their 
own public administration (77.9%). While perhaps very small at first glance, 
the difference still provides us with a valid estimation of the degree of 
realisation of national interests. One would anticipate that the contacts 
among Slovenian civil servants would have been the most intense had 
Slovenia been properly pursuing its national interests.
The frequency of informal contacts with other member states may be 
understood in two ways: either as a display of the European-oriented 
nature of the Slovenian Presidency or as Slovenia’s proactiveness in using 
these contacts for information-gathering and better coalition-building. 
The latter interpretation is hardly possible since, according to Naurin and 
Lindahl (2008), Slovenia had poor coalition-building capacity and little 
appeal as a coalition partner.33 Therefore, the more intensive contacts 
with other member states could indicate a more outward pro-European 
orientation of the Slovenian Presidency, especially since it has been 
established that Slovenian interests and priorities coincided with those 
of other European actors to a great extent (Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, 
since our survey also detected Slovenia’s lack of own national interests 
regarding many policy areas, it is more probable that the frequent informal 
contacts with other member states were the result of other member states 
lobbying Slovenia, which by holding the Presidency was the focal point 
of Council negotiations, rather than a sign of Slovenian proactiveness. This 
would also explain why contacts with the other member states were more 
frequent than with either the GSC or the EC. 
33 The study from Naurin and Lindahl (2008) on coalition-building in the Council indicated that Slovenia was ranked 
among the last three member states as regards the coalition potential index.
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Table 6. Comparison of the Evaluation of Cooperation with the Slovenian 
Public Administration (Average Score on a Scale from 1 to 5) 
Actors







Ministry of origin 4.33 3.48
Other Ministries 3.33 2.90
Government Office for European Affairs 
(GOEA)
4.17 2.89
Permanent Representation of the Republic of 
Slovenia to the EU (PermRep)
3.50 3.85
Diplomatic and consular network 3.17 3.26
 
Source: Kajnč and Svetličič (2009)
There was a significantly higher level of engagement and better evaluation 
of cooperation of the Slovenian public administration when their officials 
worked on relevant dossiers (Table 6). This means that Slovenia focused 
all of its resources on being as successful as possible in those areas where 
it had some more explicit national interests (e.g. positioning itself as a 
star pupil, advocating stability, growth and European perspective for 
the Western Balkans). Conversely, the lower scores given to cooperation 
on non-priority portfolios (with the exception of the PermRep and the 
diplomatic and consular network) indicate that these areas were granted 
less time and attention. The generally lower scores of other ministries 
can be explained by the problem of fewer informal contacts with the 
country’s own public administration as well as impaired internal institutional 
cooperation. Further, the deviation of results among respondents from 
the PermRep suggests that those who possessed more knowledge were 
less keen to cooperate on the priority portfolios. This may be understood 
as the manifestation of a critical eye regarding the lack of necessary 
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E. Conclusion
By presenting a single case study based on the self-evaluation of actors 
involved in the presidency, our research cannot offer universal lessons. For 
that we should have evaluated more countries and compared the results 
of the survey with the analysis of objective criteria for the realisation of 
national interests. Yet it is still the first analysis of a new member presidency 
in its trio form and thus provides some relevant conclusions.34 Specifically, 
it both corroborates and questions certain theoretical assumptions about 
the role of small state presidencies of the EU Council and the realisation of 
national interests and provides ideas for future research.
The key finding of our analysis is that it was easier to pursue national interests 
(although very modestly included in the presidency programme) during 
the presidency as opposed to the time of normal membership. It confirms 
the theoretical postulate that the presidency can make an imprint on 
negotiation processes. Two main factors explain this. First, Slovenia did not 
have specific national interests in a vast array of areas and, second, its 
interests largely coincided with those of other European actors, presenting 
Slovenia with hardly any opposition to fulfilling its goals. This mostly explains 
why the Slovenian public administration felt that the realisation of national 
interests was facilitated during the presidency. 
The abovementioned factors also affected Slovenia’s agenda-setting 
capacity. According to the self-evaluation of its public administration, 
Slovenia’s agenda-setting appeared very sovereign and independent. 
This means the country was aware of the value of agenda-shaping 
in influencing the negotiation process and used the presidency’s 
mechanisms in line with theoretical assumptions concerning small member 
state behaviour during the presidency. 
34 Based on the initial research about the Slovenian EU Council Presidency, a series of similar surveys was conducted also 
in four other Member States when they took over the Presidency (Sweden (July – December 2009), Belgium (July – 
December 2010), Hungary (January – June 2011) and Denmark (January – June 2012)). The surveys were conducted 
in the same way in order to provide the possibility of cross-country comparison on different aspects of the EU Council 
Presidency. Our preliminary evaluation of the cross-country comparison has not showed substantial differences in 
the manner in which the countries realised their national interests. It was even more surprising that there were also no 
substantial differences between old and new Member States regarding many of the aspects covered by the survey 
(the aspects are more or less the same as showed in the tables of this article). So even though this article based its 
conclusions on a single case study, the preliminary results of the comparative study of five countries’ presidencies 
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Conversely, the same results revealed that, due to the lack of its own 
interests, Slovenia actually set the agenda mostly according to the 
trio and its own presidency programme. The analysis of the Slovenian 
Presidency programme demonstrated that all priorities, except for the 
Western Balkans, were part of the inherited agenda. The time to put 
more national interests on the agenda was when setting the presidency 
programme. Such pro-European orientation and honest-broker behaviour 
helped Slovenia gain the trust of other actors and resulted in the adoption 
of several dossiers that had long been open.35 This means that Slovenia 
was not too proactive in trying to materialise them, but was firm enough 
to achieve visible progress. This seems to have made it more influential 
in certain priority areas than in others, which is clearly consistent with 
theorised small state presidency behaviour.
This modest list of Slovenia’s priorities is a logical consequence of 
perhaps the major objective of the presidency, namely to perform well 
in the presidency and deny some pessimistic expectations that a small 
new member country would be unable to do so. Limited administrative 
capacities and lack of experience were also thought to be limiting factors 
in putting more national interests in the programme. Specialisation was 
sought to make better progress in its priority areas. Slovenia not only adjusted 
its entire presidency organisational structure to mitigate the constraints of 
its public administration, but it also intensified work on relevant dossiers, 
which was reflected in higher quality cooperation (Table 6).
 Slovenia did not take full advantage of some other benefits of small 
states’ administration since it encountered some structural difficulties that 
partially hindered the realisation of its national interests. For example, 
Slovenia did not communicate within its own public administration in 
the most effective way. The underdeveloped informal contacts were 
therefore also reflected in problems of vertical and horizontal cooperation 
as well as a stifling hierarchy, which in fact emerged as the most pertinent 
problem during the Slovenian Presidency. Therefore, many respondents 
thought these issues led to a definition of national interests that was 
interdepartmentally disunited, bad and, at times, even non-existent. Here, 
Slovenia probably missed an opportunity since more efficient working 
processes and better communication within its own public administration 
35 See footnote 30.
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(up- and downstream) would have resulted in clearly defined national 
interests that would have been easier to defend. 
In conclusion, Slovenia played according to many observers the role of 
a good presidency (Klemenčič 2007; Lenarčič 2007; Ster 2008). In most 
cases, it focused on reaching agreements rather than pursuing its own 
interests. It acted in accordance with the logic of appropriateness (see 
March and Olson 1998), the guiding principle of small state presidencies. 
Nevertheless, its realisation of national interests should be viewed far more 
critically. Namely, there were internal factors that prevented Slovenia from 
acting optimally. To improve the pursuit of its national interests, Slovenia 
would have had to raise the level of knowledge and skills within its public 
administration. Further, it could have gained more if its public administration 
had known how to benefit from the advantages of a small administration. 
It could have improved its vertical and horizontal cooperation that might 
have directly led to more coherent and clearly defined national interests 
(in both priority and non-priority areas), which would also have been easier 
to defend in practice. Improved networking skills and enhancing informal 
contacts could also have enhanced chances for the materialisation of 
national interests since these capabilities were assessed as rather poor. 
Nevertheless, the Presidency of the EU Council gave Slovenia greater 
international visibility and the results exceeded the modest expectations. 
From Slovenia’s point of view, this represents the successful fulfilment of a 
highly important national interest. 
In order to be able to generalise the results regarding the presidencies’ 
realisation of national interests, future research should include a more 
diverse array of countries in terms of size and presidency experiences, more 
issues, and the subjective results of the survey(s) should be compared with 
objective data on the realisation of priority interests of presiding countries 
(for instance, voting behaviour, evaluation of decisions taken during the 
presidencies, etc.) applying more robust methodological tools.
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